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BOOK REVIEW
The Delaware General Corporation Law-A Commentary and
Analysis. ERNEST L. FOLK, III. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
1972. Pp. xliii, 708. $47.50.
Corporation law is often looked upon as an area of the law within
the special province of state legislatures and state courts. In fact, how-
ever, corporate practice is more national than local, as exemplified by
the dominance of federal securities laws and the impact of federal
taxation on corporate planning. Furthermore, the basic corporate
statute has become significantly nationalized-not by Congress, to be
sure, but by the legislature of the state of Delaware.
Delaware is not first among the states in the number of busi-
nesses incorporated annually; that distinction belongs to New York.'
But as the legal home of the larger American corporations, Delaware
has no peer.2 Significant corporate law developments in state courts
often concern Delaware corporations. Moreover, Delaware corpora-
tion law has been applied and interperted frequently in state and
federal courts throughout the country, since conflict of laws principles
usually direct courts to apply the law of the state of incorporation in
matters involving the internal affairs of corporations. 3
The legal advisers to these large corporations are by no means
all members of the Delaware Bar. These non-Delaware corporate
counsel need a working familiarity with Delaware law if they are to
possess any expertise in corporate law.4 There is consequently a great
need for authoritative source material on the Delaware statute. This
need is heightened by the fact that the statute was overhauled in 1967
and has since been amended several times.
Professor Folk's book fills the need for that authoritative source.
In brief, this is a first-rate product of a first-class scholar. The book is
enhanced by Professor Folk's inside position with respect to the statute.
1 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., Business Economics, Monthly New Incorporations,
Press Release Y-13, No. 12, Feb. 26, 1972. In 1971, there were 44,506 new incorporations
in New York as compared with 8,410 new incorporations in Delaware.
2 See R. STEVENS & H. HENN, STATUTES, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 28 (1965).
3 See REsTATEhmNT (SECOND) OF CoNFcr OF LAws § 302, Reporter's Note at 815
(1971); id. §§ 303-07, 309.
4 I do not ever recall, for example, hearing of a New York lawyer who was a member
only of the New York Bar decline to advise a client about a problem concerning his
Delaware corporation on the grounds that Delaware was a foreign jurisdiction to whose
Bar he did not belong.
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He served as reporter to the Delaware Corporation Law Revision
Committee and has written previously about efforts to amend the
statute.5 Clearly this book is his most careful and thoughtful product
dealing with that statute. In a word, the book is invaluable.
State legislatures ordinarily do not provide any published legisla-
tive history.6 This absence of legislative material is especially regretta-
ble in the case of the Delware General Corporation Law because of that
law's national prominence. Several people who were associated with the
drafting of the statute have written articles7 and have assisted others in
their research, but these efforts fall far short of a comprehensive legisla-
tive history. Folk's commentary is not official, and if one were dealing
with a well documented federal statute, one might not accord it very
high priority. In view of the dearth of official Delaware authority, how-
ever, Folk's treatise is likely to perform the same function as official
legislative source material, thereby giving the book even greater sig-
nificance. Under these circumstances, we can be grateful that it is of
such high quality.
The book provides commentary to and analysis of the current
statutory provisions. It proceeds through the statute in order, setting
forth the official text of the law followed by a comment. The com-
mentary features subsections entitled "In General," "Scope and Ap-
plication," and "Changes in the Statute." For the major provisions
of the statute, considerably detailed explanation and a more finely
analytical breakdown are provided.
Professor Folk annotates his commentary with extensive discussion
of the case law. He looks almost entirely to Delaware cases, explaining
that to go outside of Delaware would have resulted in a much longer
book." Although this is undoubtedly true, it is also a limitation, since
5 E. FOLK, AMENDMENTS TO THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW (1970); E. FOLK,
AMIENDMENTS TO TnE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAw (1969); E. FOLK, THE NEW DELAWARE
CORPORATON LAiW-1967; Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42
CONN. B.J. 409 (1968).
0 The enactment of the New York Business Corporation Law was preceded by ex-
tensive research reports that were developed for the Joint Legislative Committee. How-
ever, they are not widely enough available to be of general benefit. Copies of these
reports may be found in the State Law Library in Albany and in the Library of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
7 In addition to Folk's materials in note 5, supra, see Arsht 9- Stapleton, Delaware
General Corpotation Law: 1969, 25 Bus. LAw. 287 (1969); Arsht & Stapleton, Delaware's
New General Corporation Law: Substantive Changes, 23 Bus. LAw. 75 (1967); Carroon,
The Proposed New Delaware Corporation Statute, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 522 (1968). See also





much important decisional law concerning the Delaware statute has
been decided by other state and federal courts. However, once the
reader is warned that the annotations are not complete, the analysis and
commentary furnish a very useful working tool, even though other re-
search implements may be needed.
Professor Folk points out that "[t]he book accepts the policy of the
statute as it exists." This does not, however, signify his "agreement
with every aspect of Delaware law."' 0 There is a tendency in other
states to emulate the Delaware statute,1 but legislative draftsmen
should ponder carefully the policy judgments of the Delaware statute
before they accept its viewpoint.12 Professor Folk is a sophisticated
scholar who knows how corporate statutes are written and the pres-
sures that produce them.13 Yet he omits discussion of the policies and
interests involved in the formulation of the Delaware statute and re-
frains from criticizing its provisions. However, I think that his decision
to make the book wholly analytical, rather than partly analytical and
partly critical, is sound, because it enables him to accomplish thor-
oughly the significant task of helping us to understand the meaning of
the statute. He would doubtless have been hindered in that effort if
he had simultaneously undertaken to criticize the statute and to ex-
plore the many policy alternatives.
In one of the appendices to the book,14 Professor Folk provides us
with interesting additional insight into why Delaware is likely to re-
main the legal home for large corporations. Management prefers to
have controversies concerning its stewardship settled in Delaware
courts following Delaware precedents. The Delaware statute invites
and facilitates that result. Section 169 declares the situs of stock in a
Delaware corporation to be Delaware, wherever the stock certificates
may be physically located.15 This permits the seizure of property of
nonresident directors of a Delaware corporation through sequestration
so as to compel their appearance in the Delaware Court of Chancery.
This statutory scheme makes it easy to obtain service on all of the de-
9 Id.
'0 Id.
11 One of the sponsors of the new Michigan corporation law wrote that the primary
purpose of the law was to "out-Delaware Delaware." Downs, Michigan To Have a New
Corporation Code?, 18 WAYNE L. Rv. 913, 914 (1972).
12 The underlying approach of the Delaware statute is explained and criticized in
Note, supra note 7.
13 See Folk, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CoNN. B.J. 409
(1968).
14 P. 565, An Essay on Sequestration and Foreign Attachment (App. 1).
IS DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (Supp. 1968).
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fendants in Delaware, whereas it might not be possible to join all of
them in any other state court. As Professor Folk points out, some attor-
neys dislike this practice so much that they recommend against Dela-
ware incorporation, but "many thoughtful persons view sequestration
as an affirmative good. It tends to center litigation in the Delaware
Court of Chancery, which has considerable expertise in corporate law
matters."1 Thus, the Delaware statute has the anomalous effect of
drawing plaintiffs into a forum whose body of law is generally favor-
able to the corporate defendant.
Certain substantive discussions in the book merit comment. More
than eighty pages are devoted to the merger provisions, making it the
most fully developed area in the book.17 A particularly helpful descrip-
tion of the procedures in different types of acquisitions, especially the
three-party merger where a subsidiary is used, is presented.' The dis-
cussion of the problems of fairness in a merger involving a subsidiary 9
is perhaps the best that I have seen. Nor will one find better treatment
of the Delaware approach to appraisal rights, in particular, the provi-
sions of section 262(k) that eliminate appraisal rights under certain cir-
cumstances. 20 The entire area of parent-subsidiary relationships is also
well treated in the discussion of sections 261 and 262 as well as in the
discussion of section 144,21 which provides new statutory rules for
self-dealing.
As Professor Folk's lengthy commentary makes clear, many of the
problems regarding acquisitions and other interested transactions can-
not be handled within the four corners of the statute. For example, the
business judgment rule is not even mentioned in the statute. As it is
used in other jurisdictions, the business judgment rule prescribes a
limited role for judicial intervention in transactions in which directors
are capable of protecting fully the interests of the corporation and the
shareholders. 22 A conflict of interest between director and corporation
removes the presumption of the director's ability to protect "fully" the
interests of others.
One would expect that if there were any significant advantage to
management in forming a corporation under Delaware law, it would
10 P, 571.
17 Sections 251-62.
18 Section 251, at pp. 326-31.
19 Id. at pp. 333-41.
20 Section 262, at pp. 391-97.
21 Pp. 75-95.
22 See N. LATrnN, CoRPoaxRoNs 273 (1971); Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems:
Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259, 270-73 (1967).
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be manifested in the area of management's dealings with the corpora-
tion. Professor Folk's discussion of the business judgment rule in his
commentary on the self-dealing transaction 23 shows that this expecta-
tion is at least partially fulfilled. Many questions remain regarding the
application of the rule in Delaware. For example, is it anything more
than a presumption of good faith action by management? Does it do
more than determine the burden of going forward with proof? What
degree and kind of proof are required? Nonetheless, it appears that
Delaware law affords liberal protection to corporate managers.
In his discussion of Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil C0.24 and Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien,25 Professor Folk shows that the Delaware Supreme
Court has applied at least the language of the business judgment rule
to transactions between a corporation and its subsidiary.2 6 The rule
as applied in these cases appears to enable a court to avoid judging the
fairness of the transaction and to ask only whether or not it has a ra-
tional basis.27 As applied in the more conventional setting of a dis-
interested transaction, Professor Folk concludes that although no
particular formalities in reaching the decision challenged are required
for the application of the rule,28 some application of judgment by the
directors is obviously necessary.
The statutory language of the Delaware corporation law is par-
ticularly unenlightening in the area of corporate finance. The Model
Business Corporation Act, largely through definition, has attempted
to clarify a corporation's power to declare dividends and other distribu-
tions and to purchase its own stock.29 Professor Folk notes that the
Delaware legislature rejected the approach of the Model Act and "re-
tained the vestigial noncomponent surplus approach."3 0 As a result,
neither the legislature nor Professor Folk tells us whether dividends
may be paid out of revaluation surplus, as appears to be permitted both
23 Section 144, at pp. 77-81.
24 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970).
25 280 A2d 717 (Del. 1971).
26 Section 144, at pp. 77-81.
27 Id. at p. 78.
28 Id. at p. 81.
29 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Coin'. Acr § 45(a) (1971) authorizes payment of cash
dividends "out of the unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus." Section 46 permits
distributions except when the corporation is insolvent (and subject to specified con-
ditions) "out of capital surplus." The key terms--"earned surplus," "capital sur-
plus" and "insolvent"--are defined in § 2; "unrestricted" is explained in § 6; and "unre-
served" is explained in § 70. See Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act, 70 HAiv. L. Rxv. 1357 (1957).




in New Yorks' and under the Model Act.32 Generally speaking, the
relationship of accounting concepts and practices to corporation law is
not spelled out very well in the statute, and it probably remains a
mystifying subject for many who need to understand corporate statutes.
Recently, much attention and controversy have surrounded the
right of stockholders to submit proposals which they intend to present
at annual corporate meetings for inclusion in the proxy materials
furnished by the company. Under the rules of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, the shareholders may require such an inclusion
subject to management's right to exclude the resolution if, among
other things, it is "not a proper subject for action by security holders."
33
The appropriateness of the subject matter is to be determined under
state law. 4 Thus, for many large corporations, the question of whether
a proposal submitted by a shareholder may be excluded from the cor-
poration's proxy statement turns upon an interpretation of Delaware
corporation law.
The most controversial proposals in recent years have been those
submitted by so-called corporate activists, such as the Project on Cor-
porate Responsibility, 35 which has waged several proxy contests with
General Motors, a Delaware corporation. The proposals have sought
to enlarge General Motors' board of directors, to compel disclosure of
information regarding racial discrimination, pollution, and safety, to
create shareholder committees that would report on areas of public
concern, and to change the method of nominating and electing direc-
tors of the corporation.
SEC rules require a corporation that objects to the inclusion of a
proposal to attach an opinion of counsel stating that the proposal may
be excluded under state law.36 Corporate counsel have found little au-
thority to support their opinion that certain proposals are not proper
under state law.37 Professor Folk does not furnish them with signifi-
cantly more authority, although he does state that "§ 141(a) probably
vests in the board of directors all powers not reserved by law, by the
31 N.Y. Bus. Cons. LAW §§ 102(a)(6), 510 (McKinney 1963).
32 ABA-AL MoDEL BUS. Corn,. Act § 2, Comment at 36 (1971).
33 Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(c)(I), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1) (1972).
34 Id.; see SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332
U.s. 847 (1948).
35 This reviewer must now reveal his bias and disclose that he has served as counsel
to the Project on Corporate Responsibility in its efforts to present stockholder proposals.
36 Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(d) (1972).
37 The materials filed by General Motors were made public records by the Com-
mission on September 22, 1972. See Public Availability of Materials Filed Pursuant to
§ 240.14a-8(d) and Related Materials, 37 Fed. Reg. 20,557 (1972).
[Vol. 58:625
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certificate of incorporation or by the by-laws, to the stockholders, or
delegated by the board to the corporation's officers." 38 However, this
does not tell us that stockholders may not, as a matter of right, compel
the directors to listen to stockholder opinion presented in the form of
a resolution, even though corporate action must await director resolu-
tion. This possibility would relate both to shareholder "recommenda-
tions" to the board of directors and broad shareholder mandates of
corporate policy that, as a practical matter, only provide guidelines for
director action. A leading New York decision, Atuer v. Dressel,39 is
often cited for the proposition that stockholders may require a meeting
to be called in order to take a vote on certain matters that are within
the sole jurisdiction of the board of directors.40 If no statute circum-
scribes the power to require the board to make available an opportunity
to speak, it probably exists as a common law right. Nothing in Delaware
appears to the contrary.
Of course, as a matter of state law, stockholders cannot force an
avenue for their collective opinion on all questions. 41 Mundane opera-
tional matters are not the concern of stockholders. The proper resolu-
tion of the issue of the allocation of corporate powers, or the extent to
which stockholders may force consideration by the board of the views
of the stockholders, may turn on a matter of policy as to how one
views the corporation. The decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia in Medical Committee for Human
Rights v. SEC42 involving a stockholder proposal submitted to the
Dow Chemical Corporation, may well afford a rationale applicable
under state law. In its dicta, the court strongly suggested that stock-
holders have a right to consider those aspects of corporate business
activity that significantly affect public policy.43
38 Section 121, at p. 34.
89 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954).
40 The SEC has followed this approach in determining the appropriateness of in-
clusion of shareholder proposals. See Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Minutes of Commission
Meeting, Feb. 28, 1964, excerpted in W. CARY, CASM AND MATERIALs ON CORPORATIONS
327 (4th ed. 1969); Columbia Pictures Corp., Minutes of Commission Meeting, Nov. 23,
1964, cited in Note, Shareholder Proposals: The Experience of Rule 14a-8, 59 GEo. L.J.
1343, 1370 n.150 (1971).
41 The stockholders' right to speak is properly limited to those areas in which
stockholders are capable of providing intelligent judgment. See Carter v. Portland Gen-
eral Elec. Co., 227 Ore. 401, 407, 362 P.2d 766, 769 (1961).
42 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
43 432 F.2d at 678-81. The recent decision of State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell,
Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 191 N.W.2d 406 (1970), not cited by Professor Folk, demonstrates
another context in which this issue may arise. The case was decided by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, but it involved a Delaware corporation. The issue in Pillsbury concerned
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One final note on the great value of Professor Folk's book is in
order. If the time ever comes when Congress considers the enactment
of a federal corporation law, the task must begin by an attempt to
understand the workings of our most important state statute. No better
guide than that provided by Professor Folk could be found.
Donald E. Schwartz*
whether a stockholder could inspect the stockholder list, a right which he could exer-
cise under Delaware General Corporation Law section 220 if he had a "proper purpose."
The stockholder wanted the company to stop producing anti-personnel weapons. The
court decided that the stockholder did not have a proper interest since his real concern
was not with the well-being of the corporation but with influencing public policy. The
decision appears to hold as a matter of law that a proper stockholder interest in the
corporation relates only to profitability and not to the quality of corporate conduct.
This seems entirely too narrow. It does not accord with the business community's
notion of the place of business in the world today (see generally COMMrrra rop
ECONoMIc IDEvaLoPMENT, SocIALL REsPONSIBILrriEs op BUSINESS (1971)) or with the role
that many shareholders see for themselves. See, e.g., J. SIMON, C. PowRs & J. GUNNE-
MANN, THE ETmICAL INVEsrOR: UNIvRsrrms AND CotoRAT REsPONsmrry (1972).
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University. A.B. 1952, Union College; LL.B. 1955,
Harvard University; LL.M. 1966, New York University.
